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My son, of course we know very well that the infidel [namely, the Ottomans] 
dread the day we come to an agreement and unite with the Franks; for, they believe 
that if this happens, because of us they would suffer much at the hands of the 
Christians of the West. Therefore, as far as this council is concerned continue and 
study, and bring it up, especially when you need to scare the infidel. But, do not at-
tempt to bring it about, for I see that our own people are unable to find a way for 
union, peace and concordance, unless they were returned to our original state. And 
since this is almost impossible, I fear a worse schism may be brought about, and 
hence we shall be left defenceless before the infidel ...2. 
                                                
1 This paper, originally delivered at the International Colloquium Motivi e strutture di 
divisioni ecclesiali, organised by the Pontificio Comitato di Scienze Storiche at Corfù, 10-13 
April 2007, is dedicated to the memory of my teacher and friend Julian Chrysostomides, who 
read it in its final form and made valuable comments before she passed away on 18 October 
2008. On the Council of Ferrara-Florence see in general J. GILL, The Council of Florence, 
Cambridge 1959; IDEM, Personalities of the Council of Florence and other Essays, Oxford 
1964; G. ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity: the Council of Ferrara-Florence, 1438/39-1989, Leu-
ven 1991; A. PAPADAKIS - J. MEYENDORFF, The Christian East and the Rise of the Papacy: The 
Church 1071-1453 A.D., Crestwood (NY) 1994, 357-409: D. J. GEANAKOPLOS, The Council of Flor-
ence (1438-1439) and the Problem of the Union between the Greek and Latin Churches, in: 
ChH24 (1955) 324-46, in: IDEM, Constantinople and the West: Essays in the Late Byzantine 
(Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman Churches, Madison 
(Wisconsin) 1989, 224-254, fully revised under the title: A New Reading of the Acta, Espe-
cially Syropoulos, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as above), 325-51: P. VITTI (ed.), Firenze 
e il Concilio del 1439, 2 vols., Florence 1995. 
2 GEORGE SPHRANTZES, Chronicon Minus, XXIII, 5-6, in: R. MAISANO (ed.), Giorgio Sfranze, 
Cronaca, Rome 1990 (= CFHB 29), 82.1-15: εἶπεν ὁ ἀοίδιμος βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν 
βασιλέα κῦρ Ἰωάννην μόνος πρὸς μόνον, ἱσταμένου καὶ ἐμοῦ μόνου ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν, ἐμ-
πεσόντος λόγου περὶ τῆς συνόδου· υἱέ μου, βεβαίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα ἐκ μέσης τῆς 
καρδίας αὐτῶν δὴ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὅτι πολλὰ τοὺς φοβεῖ, μὴ συμφωνήσωμεν καὶ ἑνωθῶμεν μὲ 
τοὺς Φράγγους· ἔχουν το γὰρ ὅτι, ἂν τοῦτο γένηται, θέλει γενεῖν μέγα τι κακὸν εἰς αὐτοὺς 
παρὰ τῶν τῆς Δύσεως Χριστιανῶν δι’ ἡμᾶς. Λοιπὸν τὸ περὶ τῆς συνόδου, μελέτα μὲν αὐτὸ 
καὶ ἀνακάτωνε, καὶ μάλισθ’ ὅταν ἔχεις χρείαν φοβῆσαι τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς. τὸ δὲ νὰ ποιήσῃς 
αὐτήν, μηδὲ ἐπιχειρησθῇς αὐτο, διότι οὐδὲν βλέπω τοὺς ἡμετέρους ὅτι εἰσὶν ἁρμόδιοι πρὸς 
τὸ εὑρεῖν τινα τρόπον ἑνώσεως καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας, ἀλλ’ ὅτι νά ἐσμεν ὡς ἀρχῆθεν. 
132 Charalambos Dendrinos 
This is the advice Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425) gave to his son and 
successor John VIII (1425-48) in private, after the old Emperor, partly 
paralysed by a stroke in October 1422, had entrusted him with the then on-
going negotiations with the envoy of Pope Martin V (1417-31), Antonio da 
Massa, concerning the prospects of an ecumenical council that would bring 
about the union of Eastern and Western Christendom. 
According to the historian George Sphrantzes, who was present at this 
meeting, having listened to his father’s advice for caution over Church 
union John left deep in thought without saying a word3. Apparently, his in-
tentions were quite different. He was determined to proceed with his plans 
for union, convinced that this was the only way that would secure military 
help from the West for the survival of the Empire. As events subsequently 
proved, Manuel showed himself to have been of sounder judgement in so 
far as the assessment of the various compelling factors that lay behind the 
efforts for union was concerned. His long political experience together 
with his theological knowledge made him fully aware of the realities and 
complexities relating to the union, which continued to play a pivotal role 
in the last great, though unsuccessful, attempt to mend the breach be-
tween the Greek and Latin Churches at the Council of Ferrara-Florence be-
tween 1438 and 1439. It is these inextricable historical, political, ecclesias-
tical, theological and psychological dimensions summed up by Manuel that 
will be briefly revisited, in an attempt to re-examine the reasons why did 
the Union of the Churches proclaimed in Florence fail. 
There is an old assumption, unfortunately still prominent among sections 
of the academic community and the wider educated public, that the date of 
the schism between the two Churches should be firmly placed in the year 
1054, when Patriarch Michael Cerularios (1043-58) and Humbert of Silva 
Candida, the representative of Pope Leo IX (1049-54), exchanged mutual 
excommunications. This view has long been proven to be unfounded. For, 
the papal bull of excommunication was directed only against Cerularios 
and certain other churchmen who took part in the controversy during 
Humbert’s visit to Constantinople, and not against the Orthodox Church as 
a whole. Similarly, the Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople anathe-
                                                                                                              
τούτου δὲ ἀδύνατον ὄντος σχεδόν, φοβοῦμαι μὴ καὶ χεῖρον σχίσμα γένηται (Matthew 9:16, 
Mark 2:21), καὶ ἰδοὺ ἀπεσκεπάσθημεν  εἰς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς. Cf. S. SYROPOULOS, Mémoires, V. LAU-
RENT (ed.), Les Mémoires du grand Ecclésiarque de l’Église de Constantinople Sylvestre Syro-
poulos sur le concile de Florence (1438-1439), Rome 1971 (= CFI ser. B, 9), Appendix III, Text 
and variants in Recension B, 14 (12), 606.17-29.  
3 SPHRANTZES (as note 2), XXIII, 7, in: MAISANO (ed.), 82.16-26.  
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matized only Humbert as being responsible for the controversy, and not 
the Pope (who was by then dead) or the Latin Church4.  
From the Byzantine point of view these events were not considered as the 
decisive point, a point of no return one might say, in so far as the relations 
of the two Churches were concerned. A close study of the Greek sources of 
the twelfth and thirteenth century has confirmed this view5, while a 
preliminary examination of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century sources, 
though mentioning these events, seem to point to the same conclusions6. 
The schism, as has been pointed out7, was rather a gradual process of es-
trangement, exacerbated by the political events that culminated with the 
capture of Constantinople by the army of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and 
the partition of the Byzantine Empire that followed. 
                                                
4 See A. MICHEL, Humbert und Kerullarios, 2 vols., Paderborn 1924-1930; S. RUNCIMAN, The 
Eastern Schism, (Oxford 1955) repr. 1997; P. LEMERLE, L’Orthodoxie byzantine et l’oecuménis-
me médiéval: les origins du schisme des Églises, in: BAGB 4ème sér., 2 (1965) 228-246; M. H. 
SMITH III, And Taking Bread … Cerularius and the Azyme Controversy of 1054, Paris 1978; P. 
BOUMIS, Τὰ ἀναθέματα Ρώμης-Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ ἡ κανονικότης αὐτῶν, Athens 1980; 
A. BAYER, Spaltung der Christenheit. Das sogenannte Morgenländische Schisma von 1054, 
Cologne, etc. 2002 (= BAKG 53). On a comprehensive survey of the sources and secondary 
studies, see now E. CHRYSOS, 1054: Schism?, in: Christianità d’Occidente e Christianità 
d’Oriente (secoli VI-XI), (Settimane di Studio dell Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi sull’ 
Alto Medioevo LI, 24-30 aprile 2003), Spoleto 2004, 547-71. 
5 See T. KOLBABA, The Legacy of Humbert and Cerularius: The Tradition of the Schism of 
1054 in Byzantine Texts and Manuscripts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in: Ch. 
DENDRINOS - J. HARRIS - E. HARVALIA-CROOK - J. HERRIN (eds.), Porphyrogenita: Essays on the His-
tory and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, Al-
dershot–Burlington 2003, 47-61. 
6 Michael Psellos (1018-78 or 1096/7) mentions these events in his memorial oration for 
Cerularios, without referring to a schism, K. SATHAS (ed.), Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, Athens 
1874, 348-49. It is the unionist Patriarch John XI Bekkos (1275-82) in his Second Oration on his 
own Deposition (= PG 141), col. 980, who refers to the irreconcilable schism that took place un-
der Cerularios. On the other hand, Joseph Bryennios (ca.1350-ca.1431) the most prominent 
and influential theologian of his times, placed the schism in 1003: Third Dialogue with the Lati-
nophrones in Constantinople on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, Ε. VOULGARIS (ed.), Τὰ Εὑρεθέντα, 
3 vols., (Leipzig 1768) repr. Thessalonike 1991, vol. 1, 379.14-24; on the date of this Dialogue 
(1422) see R.-J. LOENERTZ, Pour la chronologie des oeuvres de Joseph Bryennios, in: REByz 7 
(1949) 30-32. Pope John XVIII (1004-9) was the last Pope whose name was mentioned in the 
Constantinopolitan diptychs, but the names of his predecessors, Gregory V (996-999) and 
Sylvester II (999-1003), were not recorded in the diptychs: see RUNCIMAN, The Eastern Schism 
(as note 4), 32ff.   
7 See A. PAPADAKIS, The Problem of Religious Union and its Literature, in: AHC 38 (2006) 
287-302. See also note 4. 
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Between the events of 1054 and the Council of Florence numerous negotia-
tions were conducted between the papacy and the Byzantine government 
and Church in an attempt to bring about understanding and reconciliation 
between the two Churches8, while on two occasions union was actually 
proclaimed. First, after the establishment of the Roman Catholic bishoprics 
following the Latin occupation of the Empire in 1204, and secondly at the 
Council of Lyons in 1274, as part of Michael VIII Palaeologus’ efforts to con-
solidate his authority following the restoration of the Empire. In the for-
mer case (in 1204) the union was a result of the attempts by the Latin 
Church to impose obedience to Rome9, to which the Byzantines responded 
by acts such as purifying their altars each time they were used by the Latin 
clergy and re-baptizing their children following their baptism in the Latin 
rite, as reflected in the fourth canon of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215)10. 
In the second case, the union proclaimed at the Council of Lyons followed 
the personal conversion of the Emperor, who committed himself to per-
suade the Orthodox clergy and people to accept Roman Catholicism though 
keeping certain rites according to the Orthodox custom11. In both cases, 
however, the union was short lived with no lasting effect. 
Similar reasons that proved an obstacle to true union then, seem to have 
prevented the success of the final major attempt to heal the rift in the pe-
riod after the Council of Florence. This becomes evident when examining 
the political circumstances, attitudes and motivations of the parties con-
cerned. 
With Western Europe suffering from the Hundred Years War and the con-
tinuous upheaval and internal strife among secular powers and factions, 
the Latin Church was no less in crisis as a result of the constitutional con-
troversy led by the conciliarist movement. Following the Council of Con-
stance (1414-18), which with the help of Western potentates put an end to 
the Western Schism (1378-1417), the Council of Basel (1431-49) attempted 
to fulfil the demand for reform, re-affirming its position to impose the 
                                                
8 See L. BRÉHIER, Attempts at Reunion of the Greek and Latin Churches, Cambridge 1936 
(= CMH 4), 594 ff.; cf. GEANAKOPLOS, The Council of Florence (as note 1), 324 with n. 2. 
9 See J. M. HUSSEY, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire, (Oxford 1986) repr. 
1990, 184-219; PAPADAKIS - MEYENDORFF, The Christian East and the Rise of the Papacy (as note 
1), 199-238. 
10 J. ALBERIGO (ed.) et al., Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, Bologna 31973, 235-236; cf. 
GEANAKOPLOS, The Council of Florence (as note 1), 332-33 with n. 77. 
11 See D. M. NICOL, The Byzantine Reaction to the Second Council of Lyons, 1274, Cam-
bridge 1971 (= SCH 7), 113-46, reprinted: in IDEM, Byzantium: its Ecclesiastical History and 
Relations with the Western World, London 1972, art. 6. See also HUSSEY (as note 9), 220-242. 
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principle of conciliar supremacy over the Pope12. On his part Pope Eugenius 
IV (1331-47) was committed to defend papal authority, trying initially, 
though unsuccessfully, to dissolve the Council. In this conflict the union of 
the Christian Churches became an issue between the conciliarists and the 
papacy. For success over this most important question would strengthen 
their position over the whole Latin Church. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that both Pope Eugenius and the Council of Basel, divided by their shared 
objective, negotiated separately with the Byzantines. 
No less divided were the Byzantine State, Church and society in this period. 
However, before examining more closely these divisions with regard to the 
negotiations for Church union, it is essential to clarify the role of the Byz-
antine Emperor in ecclesiastical matters, for this would explain to a large 
extent John VIII’s attitude towards the Byzantine Church in general, and 
the Greek delegation in Ferrara-Florence in particular. According to the 
Byzantine political ideology, reflected in Justinian’s Novels13 and later on in 
the Eisagōgē14, while the secular and ecclesiastical authorities are clearly 
separate – with the Emperor exercising political authority over the State, 
and the Patriarch over the Church in terms of spiritual, doctrinal and ec-
clesiastical matters – the divinely appointed Emperor, the representative 
of God on earth, the incarnate law (ἔμψυχος νόμος), maintained the right 
and duty to defend the Church and its doctrines. Similarly, canon law, in-
cluding the decrees of the ecumenical councils, assumed the authority of 
secular law15. The imperial privilege of selecting the Patriarch to be ap-
pointed from a list of three candidates prepared by the Holy Synod, and 
the custom of the Patriarch offering the crown to the Emperor during the 
enthronement ceremony, symbolised the principle of συναλληλία, that is 
inter-dependence, in the sense of co-operation and concordance, between 
Church and State for the welfare of the people. Needless to say that this 
principle though largely observed not always proved inviolate16. 
                                                
12 See J. W. STIEBER, Pope Eugenius IV, the Council of Basel and the Secular and Ecclesias-
tical Authorities in the Empire, Leiden 1978 (= SHCT 13). 
13 R. SCHOELL (ed.), Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. 3, (Berlin 1912) phot. repr. 1954, in: Novella 
109, Epilogue, 519.35-520.7. 
14 Cf. I. and P. ZEPOS (eds.), Jus Graeco-Romanum, vol. 2, (Athens 1931) repr. Darmstadt 
1962, Εἰσαγωγὴ II. Περὶ Βασιλείας, δ΄., 241.4-7; ε΄., 241.8-16. 
15 R. SCHOELL ed., (as note 13), Novella 131, κεφ. α΄, 654.24-655.8. See Sp. TROIANOS, 
‘Θεσπίζομεν τοίνυν, τάξιν νόμων ἐπέχειν τοὺς ἁγίους ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς κανόνας …’, in: 
Δώρημα στον Ἰ. Καραγιαννόπουλο (= Βυζαντινά 13 [1985]), 1191-1200. 
16 See Ch. DENDRINOS, Ἡ ἐπιστολή τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Μανουὴλ Β΄ Παλαιολόγου πρὸς τὸν 
Ἀλέξιο Ἰαγοὺπ καὶ οἱ ἀντιλήψεις του περὶ τῆς σπουδῆς τῆς θεολογίας καὶ τῶν σχέσεων Ἐκ-
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This was also the case after the restoration of the Empire in 1261, when the 
Byzantine Emperor found himself exercising his authority over a shadow 
of the former imperial territory, now limited to the well-fortified city of 
Constantinople, parts of the Morea and a few islands in the Aegean. In con-
trast, the Patriarch of Constantinople extended his spiritual and ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction well beyond the boundaries of the Empire, including Rus-
sia and the Balkans. Yet, in the eyes of the Orthodox Church and people the 
Byzantine Emperor was the only legitimate ruler of the Roman Empire and 
direct successor of Constantine I (324-37)17. This is above all reflected in the 
well-known letter of Patriarch Anthony IV in 1393 to the Russian Grand 
Duke Basil I, in response to the latter’s challenging the authority of the 
Emperor by omitting the commemoration of his name in Russian 
churches18. 
This ‘duality’ occasionally created tension between the Emperor and the 
Patriarch, when the former challenged the independence of the Church in 
an attempt to use its spiritual and ecclesiastical authority as an extension 
of imperial authority and policy. Following the civil war and the abdication 
of John VI Cantacuzenus (1347-54), the Emperor John V Palaeologus (1341-
91) in his effort to curb the reaction of the Church against his unionist at-
tempts, compelled the Patriarch and the Synod to accept a series of impe-
rial privileges over ecclesiastical affairs, which in effect placed the Church 
under imperial control19. These privileges were renewed by his son, Em-
peror Manuel II, who did not hesitate to exercise the right to appoint met-
ropolitans without the prior consent of the Synod in vacant sees outside 
the Byzantine territory, for which he faced strong reaction from the Patri-
                                                                                                              
κλησίας καὶ Πολιτείας, in: Φιλοσοφίας Ἀνάλεκτα 1 (2001), 58-74, esp. 68-69 and notes 65-69 
(with bibliography). 
17 See S. RUNCIMAN, Manuel II and the See of Moldavia, in: J. CHRYSOSTOMIDES (ed.), Καθ-
ηγήτρια. Essays presented to Joan Hussey for her 80th birthday, Camberley 1988, 515-20. 
18 Ed. F. MIKLOSICH - J. MÜLLER, Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani, vol. 2, (Vienna 
1862) phot. repr. Darmstadt 1968, 188-92; cf. J. DARROUZÈS, Régestes des actes du Patriarchat 
de Constantinople, 1: Les Actes des patriarches, fasc.6, Paris 1979, no. 293, 210-12. Promoting 
the imperial policy, Patriarch Anthony IV in his letters of January 1397 addressed to Jagiel-
lo, Grand Duke of Lithuania and King of Poland, and to Kyprianos, Metropolitan of Kiev, 
urged the formation of a crusade under Sigismund against the Turks: MIKLOSICH -MÜLLER (as 
note 18), nos. 515-516, 280-85; DARROUZÈS (as above),  nos. 3039-3040, 302-305. 
19 DARROUZÈS (as note 18), 7, no. 3299, 10; V. LAURENT, Les droits de l’empereur en matière 
ecclésiastique. L’accord de 1380-1382, in: REByz 13 (1955) 5-20; trans. D. J. GEANAKOPLOS, By-
zantium: Church, Society, and Civilization Seen through Contemporary Eyes, Chicago–
London 1984, no. 104, 141-42. 
 Reflections on the Failure of the Union of Florence 137 
arch20. It is not surprising, therefore, that Manuel’s son and successor, John 
VIII, followed the same steps. 
As far as the negotiations for Church union is concerned, it is clear that the 
Byzantine government used it as an instrument for securing the much 
hoped for Western military aid necessary for the survival of the Empire. 
Without undermining the political benefits that might have accrued from 
the union, it seems that the efforts for a re-united Church was not solely 
dictated by such aims and needs, but also emanated from a genuine desire 
to re-join the mystical limbs of Christ21. The increasing contacts among the 
highest intellectual circles, especially from the thirteenth century on-
wards, facilitated further by translations of Greek and Latin texts, paved 
the way for the exchange of ideas, including theological thought, thus cre-
ating a basis of mutual understanding and admiration22. Demetrios Cydones 
and Manuel Chrysoloras are good examples of Byzantine scholars and 
statesmen who promoted this approach.   
This rapprochement, however, did not dissipate a general feeling of suspi-
cion and resentment against the Latins by the majority of the Byzantine 
people, members of the clergy, especially the lower clergy, and the monas-
tic community, virtually identified with the anti-unionist party. This feel-
ing was further exacerbated by the activity of the Latinophile pro-union-
ists, usually led by members of the higher clergy and the imperial court, 
who driven by their desire for union, often linked with personal financial 
interests, as well as admiration for Latin scholastic thought, were seen by 
their compatriots as betraying their country and faith23. 
The Council of Ferrara-Florence, therefore, found both the Eastern and 
Western Churches in internal crisis, with centres of power struggling to 
maintain control and establish their authority. Let us now examine the po-
                                                
20 See note above. 
21 See MANUEL II PALAEOLOGUS, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit; Ch. DENDRINOS (ed.), An 
annotated critical edition (editio princeps) of Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus’ treatise On the 
Procession of the Holy Spirit (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1996), 30.12-31.7-
13, 91.3-6, 316.3-8ff. Cf. Manuel’s comments in Letter to Iagoup, ed. cit., 367.3-10.  
22 See W. BERSCHIN, Griechisch-lateinisches Mittelalter: von Hieronymus zu Nikolaus von 
Kues, Berlin–Munich 1980; C. N. CONSTANTINIDES, Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thir-
teenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries, Nicosia 1982; S. MERGIALI, L’enseignement et les 
lettrés pendant l’époque des Paléologues (1261-1453), Athens 1996. 
23 See P. GOUNARIDES, Πολιτικές διαστάσεις της συνόδου Φερράρας-Φλωρεντίας, in: Θη-
σαυρίσματα 31 (2001) 107-129; T. KIOUSOPOULOU, Βασιλεύς ή Οικονόμος. Πολιτική εξουσία και 
ιδεολογία πριν την Άλωση, Athens 2007. 
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sition held by the parties involved as far as the terms for Church union was 
concerned.  
The Byzantines traditionally held the view that only an ecumenical coun-
cil, convened preferably in Constantinople, where the two sides would dis-
cuss on equal terms the most important theological, ecclesiastical and li-
turgical points of divergence, would secure a true and lasting reconcilia-
tion24. This tenet, strongly maintained by the Church and the people, was 
promoted especially by the theologian Emperors John VI Cantacuzenus and 
Manuel II25. In this sense John VIII was following the same policy. This he 
explicitly stated during the Council of Florence, when he explained that it 
was his father that had laid the foundations for the union, which he simply 
carried on, though without mentioning his father’s advice for caution26. 
The papacy traditionally demanded union and submission (reductio) of the 
Orthodox Church to Rome, as a pre-condition to any military help desper-
ately needed for the defence of the Empire against the Ottoman threat. 
                                                
24 See J. BOOJAMRA, The Byzantine Notion of the Ecumenical Council in the Fourteenth Cen-
tury, in: ByZ 80 (1987), 59-76; A. PAPADAKIS, Byzantine Perceptions of the Latin West, 1991 
(= GOTR 36.3-4), 231-242, esp. 240-242; J. MEYENDORFF, Was There an Encounter Between East 
and West at Florence?, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 153-75.  
25 See MEYENDORFF, Was There an Encounter (as note 24), 159. Cf. Joseph Bryennios’ views 
on the terms of a possible union: Counsel on the Union of the Churches, in: VOULGARIS, ed., 
(as note 6), Τὰ Εὑρεθέντα, I, 400-424, esp. 409 ff. Cf. also John VI Cantacuzenus’ views on this: 
J. MEYENDORFF, Projets de concile oecuménique en 1367. Un dialogue inédit entre Jean Canta-
cuzène et le légat Paul, 1960 (= DOP 14), reprinted in: IDEM, Byzantine Hesychasm: Historical, 
Theological and Social Problems, London 1974, art.11. Generally see BOOJAMRA, Ecumenical 
Council (as note 24), passim; D. BALFOUR, Politico-Historical Works of Symeon Archbishop of 
Thessalonica (1416/17 to 1429), Vienna 1979 (= WBS 13), 222; D. M. NICOL, The Last Centuries 
of Byzantium (1261-1453), London 1972, 337 with note 37, quoting Edward Gibbon’s re-
marks: “the Greeks insisted on three successive measures, a succour, a council, and a final 
reunion, while the Latins eluded the second, and only promised the first as a consequential 
and voluntary reward of the third”, in: J. B. BURY (ed.), The History of the Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire, vol. 7, London 1900, 97. 
26 SYROPOULOS (as note 2), IX, 15, 448.16-23: Τὸ θεῖον ἔργον τοῦτο τῆς ἑνώσεως οὐκ ἤρξατο 
γίνεσθαι ἀπ’ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἤρξατο κατασκευάζειν τοῦτο ὁ αὐθέντης μου ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ πατήρ 
μου· … Ἐκεῖνος οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἤρξατο πραγματεύεσθαι τὰ περὶ τῆς ἑνώσεως καὶ ἐφίετο τοῦ 
τελειῶσαι αὐτήν, ὡς καλήν, ὡς θεάρεστον καὶ πολλαχόθεν λυσιτελοῦσαν ἡμῖν· οὐκ ἔφθασε 
δὲ ἰδεῖν ταύτην τετελεσμένην, διὸ καὶ ἐπαφῆκέ μοι ἵνα τελειώσω αὐτήν, καὶ ἔστι ἔργον 
ἐκείνου καὶ ὡς ἀπ’ἐκείνου πράττω τοῦτο καὶ αὐτός; cf. J. M. HUSSEY, The Orthodox Church in 
the Byzantine Empire, (Oxford 1986) repr. 1990, 285: “This may have been wishful thinking 
on John’s part: it does not accord with Manuel’s advice to his son. Events seemed to prove 
that Manuel showed the sounder judgement in realizing that the Orthodox Church of his 
day could not be won over”. 
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This intransigent stance, inevitably created resentment and aroused oppo-
sition on the part of the Byzantines27. The conciliarist doctrine, however, 
which was proclaimed at the Councils of Constance and Basel, and was ac-
cepted by Pope Martin V and Eugenius IV, respectively, marked a reversal 
of the previous policy. For the Pope was now bound to sanction the deci-
sions of a council in matters of faith, securing free and unconditional dis-
cussion between the parties involved. On their part the conciliarists wel-
comed the idea of restoration of union with the eastern Church through a 
general council28. Both Eugenius and the conciliarists, however, whose 
main concern was the unity of the Western Church, seem to have viewed 
the council for union rather as a God-sent opportunity for the Eastern 
Church (and the Hussites) to realise and recognise its errors and return to 
the Latin faith, rather than a chance for mutual communion and an at-
tempt for a deeper understanding of the different traditions in terms of 
doctrine, ecclesiology and liturgical life. 
The rivalry between the two centres of power in the Western Church con-
cerning the initiative for the convening of the council of union was inevi-
table. Thus, the Pope conducted separate negotiations with the Byzantine 
Emperor, while the Council of Basel on its own authority assumed the re-
sponsibility to conduct independent negotiations on behalf of the Latin 
Church, issuing a plenary indulgence in order to raise funds to organise a 
council of union, to which decision Pope Eugenius objected29. Similarly, the 
Pope’s proposal that the Council of Basel should be transferred to Italy on 
the grounds that this would facilitate the Byzantine delegates to partici-
pate, was rejected by the Council, as they felt that this would undermine 
their own independence and authority. After much deliberation the Coun-
cil voted for the council of union to be held at Basel, or if it was preferable 
to the Byzantines either at Avignon or a city in Savoy, to which the Council 
of Basel would then be transferred. Once more, Pope Eugenius challenged 
this decision by transferring the Council on his own authority from Basel 
to Ferrara in the Papal States. By so doing he envisaged to limit the right to 
vote in the council to bishops, thus securing an Italian dominance, in order 
                                                
27 Cf. NILOS KABASILAS, On the causes of dissension in the Church, (= PG 149), col. 685C, (trans. 
G. DENZLER, Basic ecclesiological structures in the Byzantine Empire, in: Concilium 67 [1971] 
68-89), and JOHN VI CANTACUZENUS, Dialogue with the papal legate Paul, Meyendorff (ed.), Projets 
de concile (as note 25), 172, both cited by PAPADAKIS, Byzantine Perceptions (as note 24), 235 
with notes 30-31. 
28 J. W. STIEBER, Christian Unity from the Perspective of the Council Fathers at Basel and 
that of Eugenius IV, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 57-73, 70 with note 36. 
29 Ibid., 33-34. 
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to proceed with a revision of the decrees of the Council of Constance con-
cerning the supreme authority of general councils in the Church30.  
It is clear that Eugenius’ aim to bring about the union between the Greek 
and Latin Churches, through an ecumenical council convened for this very 
purpose, apart from his genuine conviction on Church unity served above 
all his particular political aims. For, the very act of convening such a coun-
cil re-affirmed papal supremacy over the Council of Basel, and by ordering 
its members to attend the council of union in a city of his choice in Italy 
put an end to the Council of Basel31.  
The contest over the negotiations for the council of union reached its peak 
when envoys from both parties arrived in Constantinople in order to escort 
the Byzantine delegation to the West32. Under the circumstances, after 
months of internal debate John VIII finally opted to accept the invitation of 
the Pope, whom the Byzantines traditionally recognised as the ecclesiasti-
cal authority in the West, and who guaranteed the necessary funds to 
cover all expenses of the Byzantine delegation, including their travel to It-
aly and their return to Constantinople after the council. The fact that the 
Pope proposed an Italian coastal city for the council may have played a role 
in John’s decision, as this would have facilitated the return of the Byzan-
tine delegation to Constantinople should the council were to fail.  
It was in this atmosphere of division, suspicion and rivalry that the pre-
liminary discussions for the convening of the council of union and concor-
dance were conducted. 
To this should be added the unwillingness of the old ailing Patriarch Joseph 
II (1416-39) (who in fact died in Florence before the act of union was 
signed) and members of the Greek clergy to undergo the hardships of a 
long journey to Italy, coupled with their anxiety that the Latins might 
force them to accept the union by refusing to pay their subsistence or their 
passage home, should they decline to do so. This information is recorded 
by the Grand Ecclesiarch of the Church of St Sophia Sylvester Syropoulos 
who participated in the Byzantine delegation33. His Mémoires, written four 
of five years after the Council of Ferrara-Florence, is an invaluable source, 
                                                
30 Ibid., 35-43. 
31 Ibid., 58-59. 
32 GILL, The Council of Florence (as note 1), 79-82; STIEBER, Christian Unity (as note 28), 
72-73. 
33 SYROPOULOS (as note 2), II, 19, 120; see GEANAKOPLOS, A New Reading of the Acta, 
Especially Syropoulos, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 328 with n. 10. 
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in the sense that though fervently anti-unionist in his approach, Syropou-
los offers a detailed and quite accurate account of the events (omitting 
however certain meetings and negotiations, in particular concerning the 
Latin side), giving an insight to the mentality, thoughts, aspirations, preju-
dices, disagreements, sensitivities and responses of the Byzantines, both 
pro- and anti-unionists, behind the scenes34. In this respect it complements 
and surpasses the other two main sources: the Acta graeca, a record of the 
public meetings in diary form by a pro-unionist Greek bishop at the Coun-
cil, possibly Dorotheos of Mitylene, who says little about the private 
meetings among the Byzantines or the Latins and their motives35; and the 
Acta latina, an official lengthy record of the Latin documents and Council 
proceedings by the papal lawyer Andrea of Santacroce, which reflect the 
Latin view36. 
From the very beginning at Ferrara the Byzantines realized that despite 
the courtesy with which they were welcomed, in reality they were conside-
red far from brothers enjoying equal status, treated rather as schismatics 
and even heretics. The difficulty the Byzantines faced to get permission to 
use a church for their liturgical needs when they arrived in Ferrara, and 
the circulation of a Latin document at one point in the proceedings accus-
ing the Byzantines of more than fifty heresies37, are some examples which 
illustrate the atmosphere. To these should be added problems of protocol, 
including the expectation that the Patriarch should kiss the Pope’s feet ac-
cording to the Latin custom (which the astonished Patriarch refused to 
do)38, the arrangement of the thrones at the Council (with that of the Pope 
placed higher than those of the Emperor and the Patriarch)39, and the ap-
pearance of the names of the Pope and the Emperor in the Decree of Union 
(in that order) as visible signs of precedence40.  
The humiliation and insecurity the Byzantines felt was intensified by the 
fact that they were entirely dependent on the papal treasury for their sub-
sistence in Italy. For the anti-unionists the painful and long delays in their 
                                                
34 For an evaluation of Syropoulos as an hisyorical source, see LAURENT (ed.), Les 
Mémoires (as note 2), 34-35; GEANAKOPLOS (as note 33), 325-326, 332-333. 
35 J. GILL (ed.), Quae supersunt actorum graecorum Concilii Florentini necnon descriptio-
nis cuiusdam eiusdam, Rome 1953 (= CFI Ser. B, Pars I), vol. 5, facs. 1-2. 
36 G. HOFMANN (ed.), Andreas de Santacroce advocatus consistorialis. Acta latina Concilii 
Florentini, Rome 1955 (= CFI Ser. B), vol. 4. 
37 SYROPOULOS (as note 2), VI, 8, 300.4-18. 
38 Ibid., 31, 230-234. 
39 Ibid., 39-40, 240-244; Acta graeca (as note 35), 11, 35; Acta Latina (as note 36), 28-29. 
40 Ibid., X, 4, 478. 
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payment41, for which in fact the Pope had to borrow the money42, were 
clear evidence of pressure to submit and sign the Decree of union. The fact 
that some bishops returned to Constantinople richer than when they left 
for the council, and the conferment to the pro-unionist leaders Bessarion 
and Isidore of the office of cardinal as a reward for their services to the 
union were taken as further evidence of corruption and bribery. The pro-
longation and confrontational tone of the discussions further aggravated 
the feeling of frustration and betrayal on the part of the Byzantines of the 
real purpose of the council.  
The major issues that dominated the theological debates were the addition 
of the filioque clause to the Creed and the papal claims of ecclesiastical pri-
macy over the Eastern Patriarchs. Other questions included the doctrine of 
purgatory (for which there was no formulated Orthodox view and re-
mained inconclusive with the abrupt termination of the discussions in Fer-
rara), and liturgical practises, namely the use of leavened or unleavened 
bread in the Eucharist and the sanctification of the sacramental gifts in the 
Eucharist with or without the invocation (epiclesis) of the Holy Spirit fol-
lowing the Words of Institution. These latter practices, which should not 
be considered of little importance, as they were deeply rooted in the litur-
gical life of the Churches, also remained unresolved at the Council, allow-
ing in effect the two Churches to follow their own customs. What would 
prove not easy to reconcile were the divergent views over the filioque and 
the primacy of the bishop of Rome43. 
                                                
41 Ibid., IV, 42, 244-246; V, 5, 260; VII, 26, 378; VII, 28, 380; VIII, 16, 404. 
42 See J. GILL, The Cost of the Council of Florence, in: IDEM, Personalities of the Council of 
Florence and other Essays (as note 1), 166-167. 194-203. 
43 On the views of contemporary Byzantine theologians on the major theological, eccle-
siastical and liturgical points of dispute between the Greeks and the Latins, see JOSEPH BRYEN-
NIOS, First Dialogue with the Latinophrones in Constantinople on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, in: 
VOULGARIS ed. (as note 6), Τὰ Εὑρεθέντα, Ι, 352-62, esp. 356 ff; JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, Third Dialogue 
with the Latinophrones in Constantinople on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, in: VOULGARIS (ed.), 1, 
400-424; MACARIUS OF ANKYRA, Against the Latins, in: Dositheos Patriarch of Jerusalem (ed.), 
Τόμος Καταλλαγῆς, Jassy 1692-1694, 1-205 (a new critical edition is currently under prepa-
ration by Mr Christos Triantafyllopoulos for his doctoral thesis at The Hellenic Institute, 
Royal Holloway, University of London); SYROPOULOS (as note 2), V, 15, 270.16-20; MARK EUGENI-
KOS, Epistola Encyclica, L. PETIT (ed.), Documents relatifs au Concile de Florence, vol. 2, Oeu-
vres anticonciliaires de Marc d’ Ephèse, Paris 1923 (= PO 17), fasc. 2, 15, cols. [318]-[320], 
repr. in Marci Eugenici Metropolitae Ephesi Opera antiunionistica ab Ludovico Petit e codi-
cibus graecis deprompta additis ab eodem versionibus Latinis, Rome 1977 (= CFI A) vol 10, 
fasc. 2, n. IX, 141-151. See also T. M. KOLBABA, The Byzantine Lists. Errors of the Latins, Urba-
na 2000. 
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The different teachings concerning the doctrine of the Procession of the 
Holy Spirit, from the Father alone according to the Greek theologians, or 
from the Father and the Son as from one source rather than two sources 
according to the Latin doctors, are not simply based on linguistic problems 
leading to different interpretations of Scriptural and Patristic sayings. For 
the Latins the addition of the filioque clause to the Creed is a clarification 
stressing the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, while for the 
Greeks it is primarily a violation of the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils 
which prohibit any change in the Symbol of the Faith.  
What lies, however, at the heart of the filioque question is the fundamen-
tally different perception of the life in the Trinity, related to the distinc-
tion among the divine hypostases, and between the common essence and 
energy of God44. The latter issue, brought up by the Latin theologians at 
some point was censored by the Emperor, possibly fearing that this would 
be taken as another addition to the creed as the filioque clause45.  
Thus, the two sides limited themselves to defending their own position 
mainly by an arsenal of Patristic sayings. After prolonged fruitless discus-
sions both sides agreed to tackle the question on the principle of ‘the 
agreement of the Saints’ by reconciling the various sayings, focusing on 
the supposedly interchangeable use of the prepositions ‘from’ and 
‘through’ with reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit. Finally, the 
majority of the Byzantine delegation having been persuaded by the Latin 
interpretations of Greek patristic sayings voted for the addition, with the 
notable exception of a few members, including Mark Eugenikos.  
Concerning the discussion on papal primacy, the Latins maintained their 
view that the Pope was the only visible sign of unity in the Church consti-
tuted by Christ Himself, to which the Greeks objected on the grounds that 
                                                
44 See J. MEYENDORFF, La procession du Saint-Esprit chez les Pères orientaux, in: Russie et 
Chrétienité 3-4 (1950), 158-78; IDEM, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal 
Themes, New York 1974; J. N. D. KELLY, Early Christian Doctrines, London 1958; 5th rev. edn. 
1977; repr. 1993, chapters IV-V, X, esp. 260 ff; PH. SHEPARD, The Greek East and the Latin 
West, London 1959; V. LOSSKY, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, New York 1967; P. 
EVDOKIMOV, Τὸ ἅγιο Πνεῦμα στὴν ὀρθόδοξη παράδοση, trans. S. PLEVRAKE, Thessalonike 1973; 
I. BULOVIĆ, Τὸ Μυστήριον τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι Διακρίσεως τῆς Θείας Οὐσίας καὶ Ἐνεργείας 
κατὰ τὸν Ἅγιον Μᾶρκον Ἐφέσου τὸν Εὐγενικόν, Thessalonike 1983, esp. 242-44; A. 
PAPADAKIS, Crisis in Byzantium. The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of 
Cyprus (1283-1289), New York, 1983, 63 ff; A. RADOVIĆ, Τὸ Μυστήριον τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος κατὰ 
τὸν Ἅγιον Γρηγόριον Παλαμᾶν, Thessalonike 1991, esp. 143-213. 
45 SYROPOULOS (as note 2), V, 38-39, 292.10-23; GEANAKOPLOS, A New Reading of the Acta, 
Especially Syropoulos (as note 33), 345-46. 
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though the bishop of Rome is recognised as primus inter pares in terms of 
honour, any attempt to interpret this privilege beyond the spiritual do-
main goes contrary to the fundamental principle of Pentarchy decreed by 
the Ecumenical Councils. A compromise was reached by which the Roman 
primacy was affirmed, on the grounds of the decrees of the Ecumenical 
councils and canon law (and not on scriptural basis), while the rights and 
privileges of the eastern Patriarchs were safeguarded. In effect the Pope 
had secured his dominance in terms of both honour and jurisdiction. 
Despite the fact that agreement was reached with the Latin side prevailing 
over the doctrinal and ecclesiological issues, though conceding to the 
maintenance of the sacramental rites and liturgical practices of the Ortho-
dox Church, the two sides had failed to explore in a profound way these 
important questions. Should they have done so, a real understanding of the 
fundamental differences between the two traditions would have enriched 
the debates helping to bridge the gap in a spirit of joint effort and real 
communion46. To this should be added different methodological ap-
proaches – scholastic and dialectic for the Latin theologians, biblical and 
patristic for the Byzantines –, and also the fact that a large number of the 
important discussions were conducted by small committees and not in 
plenary sessions. This meant that crucial issues were debated by experts 
who were the only ones who had precise knowledge of the progress and 
details of the discussions, while the agreement for the Decree of the Union 
was reached when all seemed to be lost as a result of intransigence and an-
ger on both sides47. 
The question whether pressure was exercised by the Emperor48 on the 
Byzantine delegation to accept the Latin views over doctrine has been 
raised. The Emperor’s intentions were made clear. As Syropoulos recorded, 
in a private discussion among the Byzantine delegation John stated that We 
have come here for the divine work of union in order that this achievement with 
God’s aid will bring advantage for our country49. John’s determination to bring 
about the union during the Council was backed by Patriarch Joseph despite 
his initial reservations50. However, reading Syropoulos one cannot escape 
                                                
46 H. CHADWICK, The Theological Ethos of the Council of Florence, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), 
Christian Unity (as note 1), 229-39, at 229-30. 
47 Ibid., 229. 
48 See GEANAKOPLOS, A New Reading of the Acta, Especially Syropoulos (as note 33), 349. 
49 SYROPOULOS (as note 2), VIII, 26, 413.34-36; trans. GEANAKOPLOS, A New Reading of the 
Acta, Especially Syropoulos (as note 33), 334. 
50 Ibid., 28, 414.25-416.8. 
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from concluding that though the Emperor occasionally did exercise pres-
sure on the Greek delegation to find ways of reconciling the Orthodox posi-
tion with certain Latin doctrines, thus putting an end to the lengthy fruit-
less discussions, nevertheless the chief Byzantine spokesman and staunch 
anti-unionist Mark Eugenikos was on the whole left free to defend his 
views. His firm conviction that in matters of faith the principle of oikono-
mia, in the sense of compromise, was not applicable51, was respected by the 
Emperor52. Mark was not the only one in the delegation who opposed the 
union on theological grounds, but he was undoubtedly the leading figure53. 
When the Decree of the Union was finalized Syropoulos reports that 
Eugenius asked whether Mark had signed, to which he received a negative 
reply. The Pope then famously stated, ‘Then we have achieved nothing’54. 
Ultimately, the success of an agreement over the union depended on 
whether those who opposed it would be won over in both heart and mind55. 
Finally, the Union was formally proclaimed in the cathedral of Florence on 
6 July 143956. 
The story of the immediate reception of the Union of Florence in the Or-
thodox world is well known57. On their return to Constantinople the mem-
bers of the Byzantine delegation who had signed the Act of Union met 
                                                
51 Ibid., IX, 11, 444-446. 
52 See GEANAKOPLOS, A New Reading of the Acta, Especially Syropoulos (as note 33), 334. 
53 For his anti-unionist works see L. PETIT (ed.), Documents relatifs au Concile de Flo-
rence, II, Oeuvres anticonciliaires de Marc d’ Ephèse, Paris 1923 (= PO 17), fasc. 2, repr. in 
Marci Eugenici Metropolitae Ephesi Opera anti-unionistica (as note 43). 
54 SYROPOULOS (as note 2), X, 15, 496.16-20; cf. Acta graeca (as note 35), 469-470. 
55 CHADWICK (as note 38), 233-34. 
56 For an edition of the Act of Union with a list of the signatures from the original Lau-
rentianus Cassetta Cesarini 1, see G. HOFMANN (ed.), Epistolae pontificiae ad Concilium Florentinum 
spectantes, vol. 1, pars 2, Rome 1953 (= CFI Ser. A), n. 176, 68-79. On the ceremony of the 
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57 I. ŠEVČENKO, Intellectual Repercussions of the Council of Florence, in: ChH 24 (1955) 
291-323; A. HOUSSIAU, Réception et rejet d’un consensus conciliaire: quels facteurs ont joué 
pour ou contre la réception de la déclaration d’union entre Latin et Grecs à Florence?, in: 
ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 509-520; U. JAITNER-HAHNER, Da Firenze in Grecia: 
Appunti sul lavoro Postconciliare, in: VITTI (ed.), Firenze e il Concilio del 1439 (as note 1), 
vol. 2, 901-919; M.-H. BLANCHET, L’Église byzantine à la suite de l’union de Florence (1439-
1445): de la contestation à la scission, in: A. ARGYRIOU - C. OTTEN-FROUX - P. RACINE - G. SAINT-
GUILLAIN (eds.), VIIIe Symposion Byzantinon. L’Église dans le monde byzantin de la IVe croi-
sade (1204) à la chute de Constantinople (1453). Strasburg 7, 8 et 9 novembre 2002 (= Byzan-
tinische Forschungen 9 [2007]), 79-123; P. RACINE, L’impossible union entre les Églises 
d’Orient et d’Occident, in: ed. cit., 371-390.  
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strong opposition. Most of them, suspicious of the sincerity of the Latins 
and of the union as a mechanism for the gradual assimilation of the Ortho-
dox Churches to the Latin Church, gradually recanted58. With the Patriar-
chal throne vacant for months and the Emperor ineffective to implement 
the union (he was in grief for the death of his wife) the unionists found 
themselves increasingly isolated, while the opposition came to the open 
and grew stronger under the leadership of Mark Eugenikos (later suc-
ceeded by George Scholarios who had left Florence with Pletho and Deme-
trius Palaeologus soon after the death of Patriarch Joseph, in order to avoid 
signing the Decree).  
The condemnation of the union gradually prevailed in the Orthodox East. 
Sometime between 15 May 1440 and 1441 a repudiation of the act of union 
by members of the delegation who had signed was published59, while Isi-
dore, by then Cardinal of Russia, entrusted by the Pope with the propaga-
tion of the union among the Orthodox Eastern Slavs, was imprisoned by 
Basil Grand Prince of Moscow on the accusation of heresy, only to escape 
twice60, before he returned to Lithuania and Poland a year later (1442) to 
find the Latin hierarchy more in communion with the Council of Basel than 
the papacy61. For the next decade he would work indefatigably promoting 
union in the East. In 1443 at a meeting of the three Eastern Patriarchs in Je-
rusalem the question of the legitimacy of the unionist Patriarch of Con-
stantinople was raised, while at the same time the archpriests he had or-
                                                
58 A list of those who signed and those who did not, and those who recanted and those 
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καλία, Thessalonike 21988 (= Ἀνάλεκτα Βλατάδων 30). 
60 I. PAVLOV, The Ferrara-Florentine Union: a View from Moscow. Historical Retro-
spective and Contemporary Appraisal, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 493-507. 
61 W. HRYNIEWICZ, The Florentine Union: Reception and Rejection. Some Reflections on 
Unionist Tendencies among Ruthenians, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 521-
54; V. BOROVOY, The Destiny of the Union of Florence in Poland and the Great Lithuanian 
Principality (Byellorussia and the Ukraine), in: Alberigo (ed.), Christian Unity, 555-71. 
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dained were not recognised62. Sometime after Mark’s death in 1444 and be-
fore 1449, the Decree was refuted point-by-point and word-for-word by his 
brother John Eugenikos (who was present at Ferrara until September 
1438)63. The utterly polemical tone in John’s antirrhetic reflects the force of 
the anti-unionist sentiments.  
The union proclaimed in Florence in fact widened the breach between pro- 
and anti-unionists in the Byzantine Church and society, as Emperor Ma-
nuel II had predicted almost two decades earlier. His final warning of the 
repercussions of a possible union with the Western Church on the unity of 
the Empire and ultimately its very survival in the face of the imminent 
threat of the Ottomans, who were well aware of the Council and its after-
math64, was verified, though in retrospect this seems to have been inevita-
ble. The disastrous defeat of the Crusading army against the Ottomans in 
Varna (1444), was followed by the defeat of the Hungarians at the battle of 
Kossovo four years later, while the promised assistance from the West ar-
rived only too late. On 12 December 1452, when the final siege of Constan-
tinople was about to begin, the Greek and Latin liturgies were concele-
brated in the church of Hagia Sophia in the presence of John VIII’s brother 
and successor Emperor Constantine XI (1449-53) and Cardinal Isidore. 
There the decrees of Union were read out in Greek and Latin, as recited in 
Florence, and union was finally officially proclaimed in the Empire, though 
it was never fulfilled. 
For many Orthodox the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans on 29 May 
1453 and the dissolution of the Empire that followed was directly linked 
with the apostasy of their Emperor and Church from true faith. In their 
eyes the union of Florence not only had failed to avert the Ottoman dan-
ger, but was the very reason for their loss of freedom65. It is not surprising 
that even in those tragic moments there were Latins who saw the destruc-
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tion of Byzantium as the result of the betrayal of the union by the heretic 
and double-faced Greeks66. It is not the unio facta but the unio ficta which 
were to be blamed, according to the Latin prelate Leonard of Chios, an eye-
witness to the final siege of Constantinople67. In Rome, though never offi-
cially rejected, the Council was in essence disregarded by promoting the 
Uniate Church68. It is clear, therefore, that the Florentine union had not 
won the minds, but especially the hearts of either side, and this was its true 
human failure69.  
Undoubtedly, each period in history, including our own times, faces new 
challenges, inheriting however old problems. In this sense there are always 
lessons to be learnt, in the hope that this knowledge of the past will help us 
to understand better, or even solve, questions of the present in view of our 
common future. This is also important for the success of the theological 
dialogue among the Christian Churches today. It is only through this spirit 
of communion, free exchange of ideas, and a joint effort for mutual deep 
understanding of the various issues and traditions within Christendom, 
that an attempt to understand why, so far, the efforts for union have not 
been successful, can bear fruit – and, more importantly, try to do some-
thing about it. 
 
                                                
66 Ibid., 300 with n. 62, citing among others the uniate Joseph bishop of Methone (John 
Plusiadenos), Dialogue on the difference between the Greeks and Latins, and on the holy 
Synod held in Florence, V, VIII, XIII, (= PG 159), cols. 1328C, 1337CD, 1368C, 1372A; and the 
Italian humanist and survivor of the sack of Consantinople Ubertino Pusculo from Brescia, 
Constantinopoleos libri quatuor, I, 381-384, 581-583, ed. A. ELLISSEN, Θρῆνος τῆς Κωνσταντινου-
πόλεως, Klage um Konstantinopel, Leipzig 1857 (= Analekten der mittel- und neugriechi-
schen Literatur 3, Anactota graecobarbara 1), 20, 24; see M. J. MCGANN, Haeresis castigata, 
Troia vindicata: The Fall of Constantinople in Quattrocento Latin Poetry, in: Res publica litte-
rarum 7 (1984) 137-45. See also the letter of Vinzenz of Aggsbach (8.III.1456) to Johannes 
Schlitpacher, commenting on the fall of Constantinople to the Turks possibly as a punish-
ment of the Greeks for their decision to deal with the Pope instead of fulfilling the agree-
ment with the Council of Basel: STIEBER, Pope Eugenius IV (as note 12), 339 with note 10. 
67 LEONARD OF CHIOS, Historia Constantinopolitanae urbis a Mahumete II captae, (= PG 159), col. 
927B, cf. cols. 925D, 926A-B; cf. ŠEVČENKO (as note 46), 300 with note 63. 
68 G. ALBERIGO, The Unity of Christians: 550 Years after the Council of Ferrara–Florence. 
Tensions, Disappointments and Perspectives, in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1), 1-
19, at p. 10. 
69 As Professor Henry Chadwick has empasized in his contribution, The Theological 
Ethos (as note 38), in: ALBERIGO (ed.), Christian Unity (as note 1). 
